La tesis de la inconmensurabilidad
¿un problema para quién?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.22370/sst.2013.3.5190Keywords:
Inconmensurabilidad, Racionalidad Científica, Feyerabend, Racionalismo Crítico, Positivismo LógicoAbstract
Existe una profusa literatura que ha situado a la doctrina de la inconmensurabilidad como una objeción contra la racionalidad científica en cuanto tal. Estas hermenéuticas no parecen haber advertido quienes eran los verdaderos interlocutores de esta objeción, y por tanto, para quienes la relación de mutua inconsistencia que pueden presentar dos teorías comprehensivas, es realmente un problema. En este trabajo expondremos como la tesis de la inconmensurabilidad, tal cual esta fue formulada por Paul Karl Feyerabend, no es sino una reducción al absurdo de una particular manera de fundamentar la racionalidad científica, a saber, de una tradición epistemológica donde tanto el positivismo lógico como el racionalismo crítico procuraron definir la ciencia estableciendo una serie de distinciones que resultan ser contextualmente dependientes. De este modo procuraremos mostrar como la inconmensurabilidad en un sentido negativo puede significar el fracaso de una tradición epistemológica. Pero en un sentido positivo, revela la necesidad de buscar nuevos caminos para fundamentar y definir la empresa científica.
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