Tiempo relacional: bases para una ontología científica minimalista

Authors

  • Franco Reyes Aguirre Universidad de Chile

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22370/sst.2025.10.4907

Keywords:

becoming, change, properties, state

Abstract

The aim of this article is to defend the relational conception of time, arguing that it enables the establishment of a more parsimonious scientific ontology compared to substantivalist theory. To support this thesis, a minimal ontology is developed through an axiomatic approach, which provides the foundations for formulating a scientific ontology in which time is not considered an entity. The analysis begins with the characterization of existing entities, which form the core of  relationism, and introduces the notions of mutability, properties, and state. Subsequently, the concept of change is examined, linking it to the idea of becoming. Finally, the concepts of causality and modality are explored, along with their role within the framework of a relational ontology of time.

Author Biography

Franco Reyes Aguirre, Universidad de Chile

Grupo de Estudios de Filosofía de las Ciencias de la Universidad de Chile, Santiago, Chile.

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Published

2025-04-08

How to Cite

Reyes Aguirre, F. (2025). Tiempo relacional: bases para una ontología científica minimalista. Serie Selección De Textos , 10, 219–234. https://doi.org/10.22370/sst.2025.10.4907